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In his speech yesterday, Chancellor Rishi Sunak outlined radical 
measures to offer income guarantees to the self-employed (who 
number some 5 million) in the UK to help combat the Coronavirus 
(Covid-19) pandemic, providing that they had lodged a tax return in 
2019 and had an average annual profit of less than 50,000. Such 
individuals would be eligible for 80% of profits up to £2,500 per month, 
based on average profit over the last 3 years. 
Suffice to say, the Chancellor went on to detail that they would not 
receive any payment (a lump sum) until June. For individuals caught 
short in financial terms before then, they were left with the recourse of 
having to sign-on for Universal Credit, though the Chancellor was at 
pains to point out that the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 
could make cash-advance payments to individuals demonstrating 
hardship within “days”. 
At this point it must be said that these are radical measures – 
especially for a Tory government; and one committed to a regulatory 
divergence agenda from that of EU standards, which critics deride as 
a deregulatory ‘race to the bottom’[1]. As such, they are 
commendable – but are they good enough? 
We would argue, no. No in the sense that the onus will now be on 
individuals to demonstrate that they are eligible to receive this 
assistance, and will have to jump through the hoops of signing on for 
UC in the interim (with the prospect of a five-week wait) when the 
DWP are already being overwhelmed with nearly half-a-million people 
having tried to sign on over the past two weeks. With YouGov polling 
data suggesting some two million Britons have been made 
unemployed over the past two weeks[2], the human cost of combating 
the Covid-19 outbreak will be severe (in many ways). 
Beyond that, we need to consider the depth of the problem in the first 
place. First, the capacity of HMRC and the DWP to process 
applications. Like the rest of the Civil Service, they have been subject 
to hollowing out and job-shedding. Ironically, this was under the same 
party (and many of the same MPs) that now postures to “protect the 
NHS”. HMRC alone saw some 16,000 jobs cut over the past ten years 
and faces major logistical difficulties in servicing these income 
guarantees, in addition to auditing taxpayers and having to face 
customs preparations for a likely Hard Brexit at the end of this year. 
Second, the Government, has presided (deliberately, one might say, 
given its pen chance for deregulatory zeal in the labour market) over 
the creation of the gig economy which has seen some 25% of the 
workforce left without basic protections such as sick pay. As such, it 
has found itself caught out over individuals who might be ill, yet will 
still go to work, thus potentially spreading the Covid-19 contagion. 
Finally, the rising incidence of children living in poverty and use of 
food banks in the UK (at record levels) points to the stark erosion of 
the benefits system (most notably in the form of working family tax 
credits) that has put a severe strain on ordinary families – with single-
parent households particularly vulnerable. 
For us, this suggests that far from being a panacea, the Chancellor’s 
measures must be seen as temporary, or just “sticking plaster”. In 
contrast, we argue that it is time for a root-and-branch reform of the 
UK tax and benefits system, to embrace the concept of a basic 
income, so as to protect employees, gig workers, carers and children 
alike. We have argued elsewhere about such an income 
being contingent (REF Conversation piece here) on engaging in some 
kind of economic activity (work, training or caring) but acknowledge 
that this would come with enforcement costs. Hence, at this crucial 
juncture we wish to elucidate the case for a basic income first and try 
to ascertain the cost – i.e., would it be affordable by UK PLC? 
To commence, let us consider the relevant population. There are a 
total of 66.4 million individuals currently living in the UK, according to 
the most recent official figures (Office for National Statistics, 2018b). 
To pay each and every one of them an amount equivalent to the 
current state pension (£8767.20 per annum) would cost £582.5bn. 
The UK economy is approximately £2tn in size (Office for National 
Statistics, 2019), so this amount would be in excess of 25% of GDP. 
Current government spending is in excess of £800bn. 
However, the true cost of a policy is its net additional cost and here 
things become somewhat murkier depending on eligibility and the 
precise policy formulation. After all, of this 66.4million people, not all 
will be eligible for a basic income: some will be international students 
and others will fall into migrant groups ineligible for such a payment. 
In the most recent fiscal year (2018-19) the UK Government spent 
£117bn on pensions (HM Treasury, 2018), which is overwhelmingly 
accounted for the by state pension and various top-ups. Since 
pensioners are already paid a state pension, the basic income would 
replace this (at zero detriment to them). This would reduce the net 
cost of a UBI by just over £106bn to a total of £475.8bn. 
In addition, a decision needs to be made regarding payments to 
children (under 16s) and young adults (16-21). Payments to the under 
16s would cost approximately £110.7bn, so removing these would 
bring the net cost down to £365.1bn. However, there is a reasonable 
argument to be made for including children, both in order to alleviate 
child poverty and in order to fund future retirees[3]. 
A potential solution, therefore, might be to include children at a 
reduced rate – say 50%, although the figure is up for debate. This 
would bring the total cost back up to £420.5bn. However, given that 
post-16 education is essentially compulsory in England (and 
widespread in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), payments at 
the reduced rate should also apply up to 18. 
In fact, we can go further: 50% of 18-year-olds attend higher 
education and the reduced rate payment is not dissimilar in amount to 
the portion of student loans that cover living costs. A further 
substantial number attend further education and many continue living 
at home. As such, we propose that the reduced payment should 
continue until 21, reducing the overall cost to £400bn exactly. 
At present, not counting disability benefits (a total of £46.3bn), the UK 
government spends approximately £72.3bn on various income 
contingent benefits. These include £48.2bn on income support, tax 
credits, family benefits and Universal Credit and a further £22.5bn on 
housing benefit in addition to £1.7bn on unemployment. In theory, a 
sufficiently generous UBI obviates the need for any of these, reducing 
the net cost to £328.0bn. 
Indeed, the true cost is lower yet. For those earning above the 
threshold a basic income functions in much the same way as a 
personal allowance. As such, it obviates the need for such a piece of 
taxation trickery. For individuals above the personal allowance 
threshold, their marginal tax rate (and therefore work incentives) 
remain unchanged. 
The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (Office for National 
Statistics, 2018a) is a 1% sample of all PAYE employees. It gives an 
estimate of just over 22.4 million jobs in this category, of which over 
80% earn over the personal allowance. Removing this increases the 
tax take (again, without changing their work incentives) by £44.9bn. A 
further 10% earn between £8200 and £12,900. If we assume a 
midpoint of approximately £10,000 this adds another £4.5bn, whilst 
very low earners probably contribute an additional £1-2bn. 
Additionally, removal of the earnings thresholds for payment of 
employees National Insurance raises £14.1bn. For those under the 
earnings thresholds, this theoretically entails an increase in their 
marginal tax rates. In practice, however, there are very few individuals 
earning below £12,500 who would not be in receipt of some form of 
government benefits or subsidy. Since these are withdrawn quite 
aggressively as incomes increase, almost all of these people will see 
their effective marginal tax rates reduced (typically from around 60% 
to 32%). 
In total, this reduces the net cost by a further £65.5bn to £262.5bn. 
We know that the employed labour force numbers just under 33 
million (Office for National Statistics, 2017), which suggests that 
around 10.5 million workers have not been captured. Of these, there 
are believed to be in excess of 5 million self-employed and around 5 
million employees (Ibid.) 
If the 5 million additional employees have the same earnings profile 
as the remainder of the workforce then that would conservatively raise 
an additional £13.2bn. It is not clear how accurate this assumption is – 
presumably they are more likely to be in marginal or low-income 
employment, although it is possible that the discrepancy is due to 
statistical artefacts. 
The 5 million self-employed are believed to be largely lower-income 
individuals, although Philpott[4] estimates that over half earn in 
excess of 60% of median earnings. This suggests at least an 
additional £8bn from this source and potentially much more. Finally, 
there are those (predominantly but not exclusively retirees) who do 
not work but have substantial non-labour incomes. We have not 
estimated figures for these. 
In short, the net cost of such a (UBI) policy is likely to be well below 
£240bn per annum. A reasonable estimate might be in the region of 
£200-220bn on top of existing state expenditures. It would therefore 
be an affordable but extremely expensive programme. However, 
further substantial cost savings could be envisaged either by 
restricting eligibility or by reducing payments (either to certain groups 
or in totem). 
It is likely that overall incentives to work would increase, although a 
significant increase in taxes would be needed to fund such a 
generous UBI. The net effect would be to render the tax and benefits 
system significantly more progressive than at present. 
As such, we think that at a shift to a basic income model of tax and 
benefit provision, whilst “expensive”, would be affordable – and the 
costs of this could be offset against additional revenue-raising 
measures. The time has come to rethink how we look after our most 
vulnerable individuals. 
[1] Gomez-Arana, A., Rowe, J., De Ruyter, A., Semmens-Wheeler, R. 
and Hill, K. (2019), ‘Brexit: ‘Revolt’ against the ‘elites’ or Trojan horse 
for more deregulation?’ The Economic and Labour Relations Review. 
[2] https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-
reports/2020/03/24/how-covid-19-affecting-british-opinions-jobs-and-w 
[3] Retirees and children are analytically similar, in spite of their very 
different treatment under current regulations. Retirees (irrespective of 
pension type or source) are funded by the economic output of those 
currently working (Barr, 2002). The mechanisms by which this occurs 
can be either opaque – as in occupational or private pensions – or 
transparent (as with a state pension), but it is analytically 
incontrovertible. 
Children are also funded by the economic output of those currently 
working: predominantly via their parents. The difference is obvious: 
retirement is collectively funded whilst children are privately funded. 
This creates an incentive for individuals to have “too few” children – 
they must fund those children themselves, whilst being able to “free-
ride” on the output of the children of others in their old age. The 
obvious solution to this is to fund many of the costs of children 
collectively. 
[4] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/15/more-than-7m-
britons-in-precarious-employment 
Barr, N. (2002). Reforming pensions: Myths, truths, and policy 
choices. International Social Security Review, 55(2), pp. 3-36. 
doi:10.1111/1468-246X.00122 Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-246X.00122 
HM Treasury. (2018). Country and Regional Analysis. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/country-and-regional-
analysis-2017 
Office for National Statistics. (2017). Annual Population Survey Jan-
Dec 2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=co
nstruct&version=0&dataset=17 
Office for National Statistics. (2018a). Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings, 1997-2018 [Data set]. Retrieved from 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/ea
rningsandworkinghours/datasets/ashe1997to2015selectedestimates 
Office for National Statistics. (2018b). Dataset: Estimates of the 
population for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Retrieved from 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationan
dmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukeng
landandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland 
Office for National Statistics. (2019). UK National Accounts, The Blue 
Book: 2019. Retrieved 
Date  from https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgd
p/compendium/unitedkingdomnationalaccountsthebluebook/2019. 
 
